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The unidirectional Hotelling model where consumers can buy only from firms located on their right (left) 
is extended to allow for elastic demand functions. A Bertrand type model and a Cournot type model are 
considered. If firms choose location and then set prices, agglomeration never arises; instead, if firms 
choose  location  and  then  set  quantities,  agglomeration  arises  at  one  endpoint  of  the  segment  when 
transportation  costs  are  low  enough.  Equilibrium  distance  between  firms  is  lower  in  Cournot  than 
Bertrand  under  the  whole  parameters’  set.  We  also  study  the  impact  of  firms’  location  on  perfect 
collusion sustainability. We show that when consumers can buy only from firms located on their right 
(left), the incentive to deviate of each firm decreases the more the firm is located to the right (left) and the 
more the rival is located to the left (right). 
 
JEL codes: D43; L11; L41 
Keywords: Unidirectional Hotelling model; Location equilibrium; Collusion; Bertrand; Cournot 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Spatial models have received consistent attention by economists in the last decades. 
The most famous ones are probably the linear city model (Hotelling, 1929) and the 
circular city model (Vickrey, 1964, Salop, 1979). However, other spatial representations 
have been introduced recently to analyze economic phenomena for which the spatial 
dimension plays a relevant role. For example, Hwang and Mai (1990) and Gross and 
Holahan (2001) considers a barbell model where there are two cities connected by a 
highway; Takahashi and De Palma (1993) and Ebina at al. (2009) develop a quasi linear 
city model where consumers incur a costs when pass through a certain point (which 
may  represent  a  mountain,  a  river,  a  congested  bridge)  in  the  space;  Huang  (2009) 
introduces  a  two lines  Hotelling  model,  where  firms  are  located  in  one  line,  while 
consumers are located in the other line. 
 In this paper, we build on a model which has been introduced recently by Kharbach 
(2009).  He  develops  a  unidirectional  Hotelling  model  (UHM  henceforth),  which 
differentiates from the standard bidirectional Hotelling model (BHM henceforth) for 
this reason: while in the BHM consumers have a bidirectional purchasing ability, in the 
UHM  a  consumer  can  buy  only  from  firms  located  at  his  right  or  only  from  firms 
located at his left. The UHM can be used to describe spatial situations like highways or 
one way roads, or non revertible flows in gas and oil pipelines (Kharbach, 2009). In a 
location price game with uniform pricing and quadratic transportation costs, Kharbach 
(2009) shows that when consumers can buy only from firms located on their right (left), 
one firm locates in position  5 3  from the left (right) endpoint of the linear market, while 
the other firm locates at the right (left) endpoint. Colombo (2009a) extends the UHM to 
allow for spatial price discrimination and a general class of transportation costs. Firms 
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are able to set different prices for consumers located at different locations in the space. 
In a location price game, Colombo (2009a) obtains that one firm always locates at one 
extremity of the market, while the other locates in the middle of the segment. Also, 
Colombo (2009a) considers collusion between firms, and obtains that when consumers 
can buy only from firms located on their right (left), the maximum collusive profits 
sustainable in equilibrium monotonically increase (decrease) with the location of the 
firm  located  at  the  right  (left),  while  initially  increase  and  then  decrease  with  the 
location of the firm located at the left (right).
1  
Both Kharbach (2009) and Colombo (2009a) assume that consumers have inelastic 
demand functions. To aim of this paper is to extend the analysis of the UHM to the case 
of elastic demand functions and spatial discrimination. Two different two stage games 
are supposed. In one game (Bertrand), firms simultaneously choose location, and then 
set the price schedule, where prices may be different across locations; in the other game 
(Cournot), firms simultaneously choose location, and then set the quantity schedule, 
where quantities may be different across locations. We show that when consumers can 
buy only from firms located on their right, in the location price game one firm always 
locates at one endpoint of the market, while the other locates in the middle of the market 
when  the  transportation  costs  approximate  to  zero:  when  the  transportation  costs 
increase,  the  equilibrium  distance  between  the  two  firms  decreases,  but  it  is  never 
maximal. Instead, in the location quantity game, one firm still localizes at one endpoint 
of the segment, but the rival locates in the same endpoint when transportation costs are 
sufficiently low: when transportation costs increase, the equilibrium distance between 
the  two  firms  increases.  These  results  are  substantially  different  from  the  location 
equilibria emerging within the BHM. In the case of Bertrand competition, firms tend to 
maximally differentiate in the BHM if demand functions are inelastic and there is no 
price discrimination (D’Aspremont et al., 1979), while they localize at the first and the 
third  quartile  in  case  of  perfect  price  discrimination  (Lederer  and  Hurter,  1986). 
Colombo (2009b) shows that the equilibrium distance between firms discontinuously 
decreases with the degree of imperfectness of price discrimination. Finally, Hamilton et 
al. (1989) find that, with elastic demand function and perfect price discrimination, firms 
locate between the first and the third quartile. In the case of Cournot competition within 
the BHM, Hamilton et al. (1989), Anderson and Neven (1991) and Shimizu (2002) 
obtain that the equilibrium location of firms is characterized by agglomeration in the 
middle of the segment. Moreover, we compare welfare in the Bertrand equilibrium with 
welfare in the Cournot equilibrium. We obtain that, unless the transportation costs are 
very  low,  Bertrand  equilibrium  is  characterized  by  higher  welfare  than  Cournot 
equilibrium.  
In the second part of the article, we consider the impact of firms’ location on the 
sustainability  of  profit maximizing  collusion.  This  issue  has  received  considerable 
attention within the BHM. For example, Chang (1991), Chang (1992), Ross (1992) and 
Hackner (1995), in a uniform price model, find that the more the firms are located near 
in the space, the more collusion is difficult to sustain in equilibrium. Gupta and Venkatu 
(2002)  and  Colombo  (2009c),  in  a  spatial  discrimination  model,  show  that  the 
relationship between firms distance and collusion sustainability may be negative when 
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firms use discriminatory prices instead of uniform prices. When studying collusion, we 
leave apart the two stage game and we introduce an infinitely repeated game. In the 
case of price setting firms, we obtain that when consumers can buy only from firms 
located on their right (left), the incentive to deviate of each firm decreases the more the 
firm is located to the right (left) and the more the rival is located to the left (right). In the 
case  of  quantity setting  firms,  we  need  to  adopt  numerical  computations,  which 
however confirm the results we obtained within the Bertrand framework. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the UHM is introduced. In Section 3 
we analyse the location price equilibrium and the location quantity equilibrium, and we 
compare equilibrium welfare in the two cases. In Section 4 we introduce the infinitely 
repeated game and we analyse the impact of firms’ location on the sustainability of 
perfect collusion as a sub game perfect equilibrium. Section 5 summarizes. 
 
 
2. The model  
 
Assume a linear market of length 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the 
market.  Denote  by  ] 1   , 0 [ ∈ x   the  location  of  each  consumer.  We  depart  from  the 
traditional bidirectional Hotelling model (BHM) by assuming that a consumer can buy 
only  from  a  firm  located  on  his  right hand side  (Kharbach,  2009,  and  Colombo, 
2009a).
2  There  are  two  firms,  firm  A  and  firm  B,  whose  location  is  identified 
respectively by a and b. Let us denote by A the firm which in equilibrium locates at the 
left, and with B the firm which locates at the right. Each firm produces at constant 
marginal costs, which are normalized to zero. Fixed costs are nil, but the firms pay the 
transportation costs to ship the good from the plant to consumers’ location. We assume 
linear transportation costs as in Hamilton et al. (1989) and others. That is, to ship one 
unit of the product from its plant a (resp. b) to a consumer located at x, firm A (resp. B) 
pays a transport cost equal to:  x a t −  (resp.  x b t − ), where t is the (strictly positive) 
unit transport cost. Firms set location specific prices in the Bertrand game, while they 
set location specific quantities in the Cournot game. Arbitrage between consumers is 
excluded. Denote by  ) (x p
A  and  ) (x p
B  the price schedule set by firm A and firm B 
respectively, and by  ) (x q
A  and  ) (x q
B  the quantity schedule set by firm A and firm B 
respectively.  The  term  “price  schedule”  has  the  same  meaning  as  in  Encaoua  and 
Hollander (2007): it refers to a positive valued function  (.)
J p  defined on  ] 1   , 0 [  that 
specifies  the  price  ) (x p
J   set  by  firm  B A J   , =   to  consumer  x.  Similarly,  the  term 
“quantity schedule”  refers to a positive valued  function  (.)
J q  defined on  ] 1   , 0 [  that 
specifies the quantity  ) (x q
J  sold by firm  B A J   , =  to consumer x. In order to save 
notation, in the rest of the article the argument x in the price schedule and in the quantity 
schedule shall be omitted. At each location x, the demand function is assumed to be 
linear, and it is given by:  x x p Q − =1 , where  x p  is the lower delivered price offered to 
consumers  at  x  (that  is,  (.)] (.), min[
B A
x p p p ≡ ).  For  the  Cournot  game,  we  use  the 
inverse  demand  function,  and  the  price  at  each  location  shall  be  determined  by  the 
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market clearing  condition.  Therefore,  the  inverse  demand  function  is  x x Q p − =1 , 
where  x Q   is  the  total  amount  of  quantity  offered  by  firms  at  location  x  (that  is, 
(.) (.)
B A
x q q Q + ≡ ). We assume that  2 1 ≤ t : this condition guarantees that there are no 
local monopolies and that no location is left without a positive quantity in equilibrium. 
This assumption is standard in spatial price discrimination literature (see, among the 
others, Hamilton et al., 1989, and Anderson and Neven, 1991).
3  
Finally, in order to distinguish the analysis within the Bertrand framework from the 
analysis  within  the  Cournot  framework,  we  shall  identify  with  an  upper  bar  the 
variables when the analysis is performed within the Cournot framework. 
 
 
3. Location equilibrium  
 
3.1. Bertrand  
 
In this sub section we study the location equilibrium emerging in a two stage game 
where in the first stage the firms choose simultaneously where to locate and in the 
second stage choose simultaneously the price schedule.
4 In this subsection and in the 
following, the sub game Nash equilibrium concept is used in solving the game.  
In the second stage of the game firms choose the price schedules given the locations. 
Consider the consumers located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ . The consumers located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈  can 
buy from both firms. In order to avoid ε equilibria, we assume that if the two firms set 
the same price at location  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ , the consumer buys from the nearer firm; if the two 
firms are located in the same point (so that the two firms are both “the nearer firm” for 
any given consumer), the market is shared evenly.
5 Assume for the moment that  b a ≠ . 
The  equilibrium  prices  on  a  consumer  located  at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈   have  the  following 
characteristics:  both  firms  set  the  same  price,  which  corresponds  to  the  higher 
transportation costs to location x.
6 Since when  ]   , 0 [ a x∈  firm A is nearer than firm B, 
the equilibrium price schedule is: 
 
) ( ) , ( * ) , ( * ] , 0 [ x b t b a p b a p
B
a x
A − = = ∈                                                                             (1) 
 
Both firms set the same price, and all consumers located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ , in equilibrium, 
buy from firm A. Consider now consumers  ]   , ( b a x∈ . The consumers located between 
the two firms can buy only from firm B. Therefore, firm B sets the monopolistic price at 
each location x. The equilibrium price schedule set by firm B on consumers  ]   , ( b a x∈  is 
therefore: 
 
                                                 
3 The only exceptions we are aware of are Chamorro Rivas (2000) and Benassi et al. (2007). 
4 As it will clear later, the results we obtain here hold also for a sequential location game, where one firm 
enters the market first and locates, the other firm enters later and locates, and finally the firms compete 
simultaneously on price. 
5 This assumption is standard in spatial models. For more details about this assumption, see among others 
Hurter and Lederer (1985), Lederer and Hurter (1986), Thisse and Vives (1988), Hamilton et al. (1989), 
Hamilton and Thisse (1992). 
6 For a formal and general proof, see Lederer and Hurter (1986).   5 
2 )] ( 1 [ ) , ( * ] , ( x b t b a p
B
b a x − + = ∈                                                                                     (2) 
 
The consumers located at  ] 1   , (b x∈  cannot buy any product. Therefore, the profits 
functions of the two firms are:
7 
 
2 )] 2 )( ( [ )) , ( * ( )] ( ) , ( * [ ) , (
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Note that the profits functions are concave in the locations for the relevant range of a, 
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It follows that the firm B locates at the right endpoint of the linear market.
8 Therefore,  
 
1 * = b  
 
Substituting  1 * = b  into  0 ) , ( = ∂ Π ∂ a b a
A
N  and solving with respect to a, we get the 






3 6 4 2
1 *
2 + − −
− =  
 
It remains to verify that choosing the same location of the rival is never the optimal 
strategy for any firm. But this is immediate, as when the firms are located at the same 
point Bertrand competition leads prices to zero, which yield zero equilibrium profits. 
Therefore, the two firms will differ in equilibrium ( b a ≠ ). 
 
We sum up in the following proposition: 
 





3 6 4 2
1 *
2 + − −
− =  and firm B 
locates at  1 * = b .
9 
                                                 
7 Let us use the subscript N to indicate the equilibrium profits. This will become useful in Section 4 when 
collusion will be introduced. 
8 The fact that firm the derivative of firm B’s profits increases with b for any value of a excludes any 
incentive for firm B to “leapfrog” firm A by positioning at its left. For the same reason, firm A has no the 
possibility to “leapfrog” firm B by positioning at its right.  
9 Note that, given the asymmetry of the model, there are two pure Nash equilibria. One is indicated in 
Proposition  1,  and  the  other  is  simply  obtained  by  reversing  the  firms’  indices.  In  this  sense,  the   6 
 
Note that the equilibrium location of firm A depends on the transportation costs. In fact: 
 
0
3 6 4 3















Since the equilibrium location of firm A increases with t, the lower bound of the 




a ,  while  the  upper  bound  is 
55 . 0 3 ) 1 7 ( ) 2 1 ( * ≈ − = = t a . Moreover, Proposition 1 is valid also in a sequential 
location  game.  Suppose  firm  A  enters  the  market  first,  while  firm  B  enters  second. 
Solving by backward induction, it is immediate to observe that firm B chooses to locate 
at the right endpoint of the segment (recall that  b b a
B
N ∂ Π ∂ ) , (  is strictly positive for any 
a). It follows that firm A chooses to locate at  * a .
10 
 
Therefore, when the consumers can buy only from firms located on the right hand 
side, one firm locates at the right endpoint of the market, while the other locates in the 
proximity of the middle of the market (by symmetry, when the consumers can buy only 
from firms located on the left hand side, one firm locates at the left endpoint of the 
market, while the other locates near the middle of the market – namely, between 0.45 
and 0.5). The intuition is the following. Consider firm B. When both firms set location 
specific prices, firm B monopolistically serves the consumers located between the two 
firms, but, in equilibrium, it does not serve the consumers located at the left of the rival. 
Therefore, firm B has the incentive to maximize the number of consumers that patronize 
it. It follows that firm B locates as far as possible from firm A in order to maximize its 
own market. Consider now firm A. Firm A serves only consumers located on its left. 
Therefore, the higher is a, the higher is the number of consumers which patronize firm 
A. Let us call this effect as the demand effect. At the same time, firm A’s profits depend 
also on the distance between the two firms. In fact, at each location, the mark up of firm 
A is:  ) ( ) ( ) , ( * a b t x a t b a p
A A − = − − ≡   . This pushes firm A far from firm B in order 
to increase the mark up. Let us call this effect as the strategic effect. The equilibrium 
between the demand effect and the strategic effect occurs at a*. Moreover, a* increases 
with t. In fact, when t increases, two opposite effects are at work. On one hand, the 
intensity of the strategic effect increases (in fact,  0 1
2 < − = ∂ ∂ ∂ t a
A   , which implies 
that the losses caused by a movement to the right of firm A go up); on the other hand, 
the intensity of the demand effect increases as well (in fact, the higher is t, the higher is 
the equilibrium price paid by those consumers which start to buy from firm A after a 
movement  of  firm  A  to  the  right).  This  second  effect  dominates,  and  therefore  the 
equilibrium distance between the two firms is lower when t is high.   
   
                                                                                                                                               
unidirectional Hotelling  model shares the same  “coordination problem” of the  vertical differentiation 
model a là  Hotelling (see Tirole, 1988, p.297, for a discussion about this issue). 
10 Clearly, in a sequential location game, there is one pure Nash equilibrium, where the second entrant 
locates at the endpoint. Therefore, the coordination problem arising in the case of simultaneous moves 
(“which firm of the two firms locates at the endpoint?”, see footnote 9) disappears in the sequential 
location game.   7 
3.2. Cournot  
 
In this sub section we study the location equilibrium emerging in a two stage game 
where in the first stage the firms choose simultaneously where to locate and in the 
second stage choose simultaneously the quantity schedule.  
In the second stage of the game each firm chooses the quantity schedule given the 
locations. Consider the consumers located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ , which can buy from both firms. 
Given that firms spatially discriminate, each location can be treated as an independent 
market. At location x, firm A’s profits are: 
A B A A
x q x a t q q )] ( 1 [ − − − − = π , while firm 
B’s profits are: 
B B A B
x q x b t q q )] ( 1 [ − − − − = π . Straightforward calculations show that 
the equilibrium quantity schedules are: 
 
3 )] ( ) ( 2 1 [ ) , ( * x b t x a t b a q
A − + − − =                                                                         (5) 
 
3 )] ( ) ( 2 1 [ ) , ( * ] , 0 [ x a t x b t b a q
B
a x − + − − = ∈                                                                     (6)    
 
Note that, differently from the Bertrand framework, both firms sell positive quantities 
to consumers located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ . Consider now consumers located at  ]   , ( b a x∈ , which 
can  buy  from  firm  B  only.  Since  firm  B  is  a  monopolist,  it  maximizes 
B B B q x b t q )] ( 1 [ − − − = π , which yields: 
 
2 )] ( 1 [ ) , ( * ] , ( x b t b a q
B
b a x − − = ∈                                                                                      (7) 
 
Using (5), (6) and (7), we can write each firm’s profits as a function of locations. That 
is: 
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) 7 2 5 ( 3 ) 3 3 3 ( 9 ) 5 1 ( 9 19
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 b t tb a b t tb b tb ta a t − − − + − + − +
=                           (9) 
 
Both functions are concave in the locations for the relevant range of a, b and t. Note 
that: 
   8 
0
36
) 7 1 ( 2 15 ) 1 ( 9 ) , (
2 2 2
>
+ + − −
=
∂










1 *= b  
 
Substituting  1 *= b  into  a b a
A
N ∂ Π ∂ ) , ( , we get: 
 
9
) 7 6 1 ( ) 6 2 ( 1 ) 1 , (










Note  that  when  2 2 1− ≤ t ,  we  obtain:  0 ) 1 , ( > ∂ = Π ∂ a b a
A
N ,  while  when 
2 2 1− ≥ t   an  interior  solution  of  0 ) 1 , ( = ∂ = Π ∂ a b a
A
N   exists.  Therefore,  the 






+ + − +
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t t t t
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7 ] ) 2 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 3 [
1
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We sum up the equilibrium location in the following proposition: 





+ + − +
=
t t t t
a










 and firm B locates at  1 *= b .
12 
 
Therefore, when the transportation costs are sufficiently low, firm A locates at the 
right endpoint of the segment, as firm B. Hence, agglomeration arises. Instead, when 
transportation costs are sufficiently high, firm A locates in a different point with respect 
to  firm  B.  Moreover,  when  2 2 1− ≥ t ,  we  get:  0 7 ) 2 3 ( *
2 < − − = ∂ ∂ t t a . 
Therefore,  the  lowest  equilibrium  location  for  firm  A  occurs  when  2 1 = t .  That  is: 
67 . 0 7 ) 2 3 ( 3 ) 2 1 ( * ≈ − = = t a .  It  follows  that  the  equilibrium  location  of  firm  A 
decreases with the transportation costs parameter and it is comprised between 0.67 and 
1, while firm B always locates at 1. As for the Bertrand model, it is immediate to verify 
that the equilibrium locations in Proposition 2 arise also in a sequential location game. 
In this case, the second entrant always locates at the right endpoint of the segment.  
Summing up, when the consumers can buy only from firms located on the right hand 
side, one firm locates at the right endpoint of the market, while the other locates in the 
                                                 
11 As for the Bertrand model, this eliminates the possibility of “leapfrogging” by firms (see footnote 8). 
12 As noticed in footnote 9, another equilibrium, where the indices of the two firms are reverted, also 
exists.   9 
proximity of the right endpoint of the market (by symmetry, when the consumers can 
buy only from firms located on the left hand side, one firm locates at the left endpoint 
of the market, while the other locates in the proximity of the left endpoint of the market, 
between 0 and 0.33). 
Comparing  the  equilibrium  configuration  under  the  Cournot  framework  with  the 
equilibrium  configuration  under  the  Bertrand  framework,  we  observe  that  under 
quantity  competition  equilibrium  distance  between  firms  is  lower  than  under  price 
competition. Moreover, for low levels of the transportation costs agglomeration arises at 
the  most  eastern  point  of  the  segment  within  the  Cournot  framework,  while 
agglomeration never arises within the Bertrand framework. The reason of the difference 
between the Bertrand and the Cournot game is the following. While in the Bertrand 
game only firm A serves the consumers localized at the left, in the Cournot game both 
firms serve consumers localized at the left of firm A. As a consequence, the strategic 
effect (see sub section 3.1) is less strong, since a movement to the right by firm A does 
not fully reflect in a decrease of the mark up.
13 It follows that firm A has a greater 
incentive to locate to the right. Moreover,  * a  decreases with t. The intuition is the 
following. On one hand, the intensity of the strategic effect increases;
14 on the other 
hand, the intensity of the demand effect increases too, because the higher is t, the higher 
is the equilibrium price paid by the consumers which start to buy from firm A after that 
firm A moves to the right. This second effect is less strong in Cournot than in Bertrand 
(any location served by firm A is also served by firm B): in contrast with the Bertrand 
framework, in the Cournot framework the former effect dominates, and therefore the 
equilibrium distance between the two firms is lower when t is low: when transportation 




In this sub section we compare welfare in the Bertrand equilibrium with the welfare in 
the Cournot equilibrium. Let  x w  and  x w  denote the welfare (consumer surplus plus the 
profits of the two firms) at location x in the Bertrand equilibrium and in the Cournot 
equilibrium  respectively.  Given  the  linearity  of  demand,  welfare  at  x  in  Bertrand 
equilibrium is: 
 
*) ( ) * ( *) ( ) * (
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3 ) 2 1 ( tx ta tb + − + = .  Comparing  the  impact  of  a  movement  to  the  right  by  firm  A  in  the  Cournot 
framework  with  the  analogous  in  the  Bertrand  framework,  we  observe  that: 
a t t a
A A ∂ ∂ = < = ∂ ∂     3 2 ,  that  is,  the  strategic  effect  is  less  strong  under  Cournot  than  under 
Bertrand. 
14 In fact, the strategic effect is:  3 2t a
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In Cournot equilibrium, welfare at x is: 
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Let us define:  W W − ≡ Λ . We can observe that Λ is always positive unless  03 . 0 ≤ t . 
Therefore,  welfare  is  always  higher  in  Bertrand  equilibrium  than  in  Cournot 
equilibrium, unless the transportation costs parameter is very low. The following figures 
illustrate the relationship between total welfare in the Bertrand equilibrium and in the 
Cournot equilibrium (Λ). In Figure 1 we consider the case where  2 2 1− ≤ t , while in 
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Figure 1                                                       Figure 2 
 
 
Therefore, welfare tends to be higher when firms compete with prices with respect to 
the case where firms compete with quantities. The reason is the following. Bertrand 
competition is fiercer than Cournot competition. As a consequence, for equal locations, 
equilibrium  prices  are  lower  under  Bertrand  than  under  Cournot.  In  our  model, 
equilibrium locations in Bertrand are different from equilibrium locations in Cournot. 
However, it can be easily verified that prices continue to be lower in Bertrand than in 
Cournot at locations  *] , 0 [ a x∈ , that is, in those locations where both firms are active in 
both models.
15 Ceteris paribus, this tends to make welfare higher in Bertrand than in 
Cournot. Consider now equilibrium locations. In Bertrand, firms are more distant in 
equilibrium than in Cournot. This has two opposite effects on welfare. On one hand, 
higher distance between firms decreases total transportation costs, and this increases 
welfare. On the other hand, higher distance between firms increases the monopoly area 
of firm B. More locations are served in monopoly, and this tends to reduce welfare. For 
a wide range of parameters of the model, this last effect is outweighed by the other 
effects,  and  welfare  is  higher  in  the  Bertrand  equilibrium  than  in  the  Cournot 
equilibrium. However, when the transportation costs are very low ( 03 . 0 ≤ t ), firms are 
maximally  distant  in  Bertrand  equilibrium,  while  they  agglomerate  in  Cournot 
equilibrium (recall that a* increases with t, while  * a  decreases with t). Therefore, the 
monopolist area served by firm B is maximal in Bertrand, while is nil in Cournot. In this 
case, the detrimental effect in terms of welfare due to the monopolistic area outweighs 
the fact that transportation costs and prices in the competitive area are lower in Bertrand 
than in Cournot: as a consequence, welfare is lower in Bertrand than in Cournot. 
 
 
4. Collusion  
 
In this section, we consider collusion within the UHM, both under the assumption of 
price setting  firms  (Bertrand)  and  under  the  assumption  of  quantity setting  firms 
(Cournot). The two stage game used in Section 3 is substituted by an infinitely repeated 
game, which is needed in order to asses the conditions for collusion as a sub game 
perfect  equilibrium.  We  focus  in  particular  on  the  role  of  firms’  locations  (which, 
                                                 
15 One has to check that  *) ( * *] , 0 [ x x
B
a x Q p p ≤ ∈ ,  *] , 0 [ a x∈ ∀ . Details of the calculations are available from 
the author upon request.    12 
therefore,  are  kept  exogenous  in  this  section).  Moreover,  in  order  to  maintain 
tractability,  we  follow  Gupta  and  Venkatu  (2002)  and  Matsumura  and  Matsushima 
(2005) and we consider only perfect collusion. A grim strategy is assumed (Friedman, 
1971)
16 and there is perfect monitoring. Denote by 
i
C Π , 
i
D Π  and 
i
N Π  respectively the 
one shot collusive profits, the one shot deviation profits and the one shot punishment 






D Π > Π > Π . Denote by δ  
the market discount factor, which is assumed to be exogenous and common for each 
firm.  It  is  well  known  that  collusion  is  sustainable  as  a  sub game  perfect  Nash 
equilibrium if and only if the discounted value of the profits that each firm obtains 
under  collusion  exceeds  the  discounted  value  of  the  profits  that  each  firm  obtains 
deviating  from  the  agreement.  Formally,  the  following  incentive compatibility 














t δ δ , for  B A i , = . After rearranging, 
the condition for collusion as sub game perfect equilibrium of the super game is: 
 
 
*]   *, max[ *
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B Π − Π Π − Π = δ . Define  * δ  
as the critical discount factor. If the market discount factor is greater than the critical 
discount factor collusion is sustainable in equilibrium, otherwise it is not sustainable. 
Then, the critical discount factor measures the sustainability of the collusive agreement: 
the  greater  is  * δ   the  smaller  is  the  set  of  market  discount  factors  which  support 
collusion. 
              
4.1. Bertrand  
 
In this sub section we consider price setting firms. The consumers located between a 
and b can only buy from firm B, which sets  monopolistic prices. Recall that under 
competition (see sub section 3.1), firm B sets monopolistic prices on consumers located 
at the right of firm A. Therefore, the collusive profits must coincide with Nash profits at 
locations  ] , ( b a x∈ .  In  other  words,  a  collusive  agreement  cannot  generate  higher 
profits than competitive profits over consumers located at the right of firm A. Consider 
now consumers located at  ] , 0 [ a x∈ . Here, a collusive agreement may be profitable for 
both firms. Suppose a perfect collusive agreement of this type. In change for renouncing 
to compete with firm A on consumers located at  ] , 0 [ a x∈ , firm B receives a fraction 
) 1   , 0 ( ∈ θ  of the collusive profits obtained by firm A.
17 The collusive (monopolistic) 
                                                 
16  The  grim  trigger  strategy  is  not  optimal  (Abreu,  1986).  However,  “this  is  one  of  very  realistic 
punishment strategies because of its simplicity”, as argued by Matsumura and Matsushima (2005, p.263). 
The most part of the papers which study collusion sustainability in spatial models adopt the grim trigger 
strategy. See for example, Chang (1991), Chang (1992), Friedman and Thisse (1993), Hackner (1994, 
1995), Matsumura and Matsushima (2005). 








C Π < Π  respectively.    13 
price schedule set by firm A on consumers located at  ] , 0 [ a x∈  is  2 )] ( 1 [ x a t p
A
C − + = . 
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= − − =∫                                                        (12)  
 
G can be interpreted as the collusive profits that firm A would obtain if  0 → θ , i.e. if 
firm A would keep for itself all the profits it obtains when firm B does not compete over 





C Π > Π , which implies:  1 1 ˆ < Π − = < G
A
N θ θ . 
 
Suppose now that firm B deviates from the collusive agreement. The optimal strategy 
for  firm  B  consists  in  undercutting  firm  A  at  each  location  ] , 0 [ a x∈ .  Instead,  no 
deviation is profitable at locations  ] , ( b a x∈ , and here deviation profits coincide with 
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N G Π + Π − =                                                                                                          (13) 
 
Substituting (11) and (13) into  *











δ 1 *                                                                                                      (14) 
 
Suppose now that firm A deviates from the collusive agreement. Clearly, firm A has 
never the incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement through prices: there are 
monopolistic prices on consumers located at  ] , 0 [ a x∈  and therefore no deviation is 
profitable.  Moreover,  consumers  located  at  ] , ( b a x∈   cannot  be  served  by  firm  A 
whatever the price it sets. However, firm A can deviate from the collusive agreement by 
                                                 








C G Π > − = Π ) 1 ( θ , which is satisfied when  θ θ ˆ < . 
19 Note that 
B
N Π  simplifies and therefore plays no role on the sustainability of the collusive agreement.    14 
refusing to transfer a fraction of the collusive profits to firm B. Since any deviation 
induces the same punishment, firm A chooses the best deviation. Therefore, if deviates, 
firm A refuses to transfer the whole fraction θ  of the collusive profits over consumers 
located at  ] , 0 [ a x∈  to firm B. In other words, the deviation profits of firm A coincides 
with G, that is:  G
A
D = Π . Plugging deviation profits, collusive profits and punishment 
profits into  *










δ *                                                                                                           (15) 
 
Let us define  ) (
A
N G G Π − ≡ Γ  and   Γ = 2 1 * θ . Note also that  2 ˆ * θ θ = . We can state 
the following proposition: 
 













δ   
) ˆ *, [









Moreover, it must be:  ] 2 1   , 0 ( *∈ θ , with  0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ a θ  and  0 * ≤ ∂ ∂ b θ . 
 
Proof. Recall that the critical discount factor coincides with the highest value between 
*
A δ  and  *
B δ . The first part of the proposition comes from the comparison between 
(14) and (15). In order to prove the second part of the proposition, we substitute (3) and 
(12) into Γ, and then we substitute again into  * θ . After simplifications, we get: 
 
) 3 3 ( 2
) 2 1 ( 3 ) 2 1 ( 7
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Then, taking the derivative of  * θ  with respect to a and b respectively, we observe: 
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In order to find the range of the admissible values of  * θ , note that as a consequence of 
0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ a θ ,  the  maximum  of  * θ   occurs  at  b a = .  Substituting,  we  get: 
2 1 ) ( * = = b a θ . The minimum of  * θ  occurs when  0 → a  (note that  0 = a  has to be 
excluded, since it implies that collusive profits of firm A are zero as the punishment 













θ , and we 






θ .                                                                                             ■                                                           
   15 
Figure 3 illustrates the first part of Proposition 3. The bold line indicates the shape of 
the critical discount factor  * δ , which coincides with  *
B δ  when  * θ θ ≤  and with  *
A δ  
when  * θ θ ≥ . Proposition 1 has a straightforward intuition. When the fraction of the 
collusive profits on the consumers located at  ] , 0 [ a x∈  that goes to firm B is high, firm 
A has more incentive to deviate than firm B (thus,  * *
A δ δ = ), while the reverse occurs 
when the fraction of the collusive profits on consumers located at  ] , 0 [ a x∈  that goes to 
firm B is low (thus,  * *





Now, we turn to the effect of firms’ locations on collusion sustainability. We can state 
the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4. The impact of a on the critical discount factor is the following: 
 
•  If  a ∀ ∈ ), ˆ *, [ θ θ θ , then  0 * ≤ ∂ ∂ a δ .  
•  If  a ∀ ∈ *], , 0 ( θ θ , then  0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ a δ .  
•  If  ] , 0 ( ~ b a ∈   exists  such  that  ) ~ ( * a θ θ = ,  then  0 * ≤ ∂ ∂ a δ ,  ] ~ , 0 ( a a∈ ∀   and 
0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ a δ ,  ] , ~ [ b a a∈ ∀ . 
 
The impact of b on the critical discount factor is the following: 
 
•  If  b ∀ ∈ ), ˆ *, [ θ θ θ , then  0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ b δ .  
•  If  b ∀ ∈ *], , 0 ( θ θ , then  0 * ≤ ∂ ∂ b δ .  
•  If  ) 1   , [
~
a b ∈   exists  such  that  )
~
( * b θ θ = ,  then  0 * ≤ ∂ ∂ b δ ,  ]
~
, [ b a b∈ ∀   and 
0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ b δ ,  ) 1   ,
~
[b b∈ ∀ .  
 
Proof. Consider the first part of Proposition 4. Suppose that  a ∀ ∈ ), ˆ *, [ θ θ θ . From 
Proposition 1 (first part), it follows that  Γ = = θ δ δ * *
A . Since  Γ = 2 1 * θ , Proposition 3 
(second  part)  implies  0 ≤ ∂ Γ ∂ a ,  which  in  turn  implies  0 * ≤ ∂ ∂ a δ .  Suppose 
a ∀ ∈ *], , 0 ( θ θ . From Proposition 3 (first part), it follows that  Γ − = = θ δ δ 1 * *
B . Since   16 
Γ = 2 1 * θ ,  Proposition  3  (second  part)  implies  0 ≤ ∂ Γ ∂ a ,  which  in  turn  implies 
0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ a δ .  Consider  the  case  where  ] , 0 ( ~ b a ∈   exists  such  that  ) ~ ( * a θ θ = .  Since 
0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ a θ  (Proposition 3, second part), it must be  ) ˆ *, [ θ θ θ ∈  if  a a ~ ≤  and  *] , 0 ( θ θ ∈  
a a ~ ≥ . Consider the second part of Proposition 4. Suppose that  b ∀ ∈ ), ˆ *, [ θ θ θ . From 
Proposition 3 (first part), it follows that  Γ = = θ δ δ * *
A . Since  Γ = 2 1 * θ , Proposition 3 
(second  part)  implies  0 ≥ ∂ Γ ∂ b ,  which  in  turn  implies  0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ b δ .  Suppose  that 
b ∀ ∈ *], , 0 ( θ θ . From Proposition 3 (first part), it follows that  Γ − = = θ δ δ 1 * *
B . Since 
Γ = 2 1 * θ ,  Proposition  3  (second  part)  implies  0 ≥ ∂ Γ ∂ b ,  which  in  turn  implies 
0 * ≤ ∂ ∂ b δ .  Consider  the  case  where  ) 1   , [
~
a b ∈   exists  such  that  )
~
( * b θ θ = .  Since 
0 * ≤ ∂ ∂ b θ  (Proposition 3, second part), it must be  *] , 0 ( θ θ ∈  if  b b
~
≤  and  ) ˆ *, [ θ θ θ ∈  
if  b b
~
≥ .                                                                                                                             ■ 
 
Proposition 4 can be summarized as follows: when consumers can buy only from 
firms located on their right, the incentive to deviate of each firm decreases the more the 
firm is located to the right and the more the rival is located to the left. By symmetry, 
when consumers can buy only from firms located on their left, the incentive to deviate 
of each firm decreases the more the firm is located to the left and the more the rival is 
located to the right.  
The intuition is the following. Consider the impact of a higher a on  *
B δ . When a 
marginally increases, collusive profits of firm B increase by  a G ∂ ∂ θ . Instead, if firm B 
deviates, it undercuts firm A: therefore, when a marginally increases, deviation profits 
of firm B increase by  a G ∂ ∂ . It follows that when firm A moves to the right, deviation 
profits of firm B increase more than collusive profits (undercutting effect), thus making 
collusion less sustainable. Consider now the case of higher b. When b increases, firm B 
has to pay higher transportation costs when it deviates, and this makes deviation less 
profitable for firm B and collusion more sustainable. Consider now the impact of higher 
a on  *
A δ . Differently from firm B, punishment profits of firm A are affected by the 
locations  of  firms.  In  particular,  when  firms  are  nearer  (a  is  higher)  competition  is 
fiercer and punishment profits of firm A are lower. Therefore, this effect (let us call it 
punishment effect) increases collusion sustainability. Even if the undercutting effect is at 
work also for firm A (when it moves to the right and deviates, firm A appropriates of all 
the  collusive  profits  by  refusing  to  transfer  the  quota  pertaining  to  firm  B),  the 
punishment effect outweighs the undercutting effect: then, the temptation to deviate of 
firm A decreases when a increases. Finally, consider the impact of an higher b on  *
A δ . 
Clearly, neither collusive nor deviation profits of firm A are affected. Instead, higher b 
means that competition between the two firms is less fierce, i.e. punishment profits of 
firm A are higher. This increases the temptation to deviate of firm A. Of course, as we 
have shown in Proposition 1, whether the critical discount factor coincides with  *
A δ  or 
*
B δ  depends on the sharing rule adopted by the colluding firms. 
 
4.2. Cournot  
 
In this section,  we  analyse collusion sustainability when firms are assumed to set 
quantities. Unfortunately, no easy relationship between the incentive to deviate of firm   17 
A and the incentive to deviate of firm B can be derived. However, we can proceed as 
follows. Consider collusive quantities. The joint profits maximizing quantity schedule 
consists  in  a  series  of  monopolistic  quantities,  one  at  each  location.  Moreover, 
consumers  located  at  ] , 0 [ a x∈   are  served  by  firm  A  only,  since  this  minimizes 
transportation costs, while consumers located at  ] , ( b a x∈  are served by firm B only, 
since this is the only feasible solution in the UHM. The monopolistic quantity sold by 
firm A on consumers located at  ] , 0 [ a x∈  is  2 )] ( 1 [ x b t q
A
C − − = . As for Bertrand, in 
change for renouncing to compete with firm A on consumers located at  ] , 0 [ a x∈ , firm 
B receives a fraction  ) 1   , 0 ( ∈ θ  of the collusive profits of firm A. Since under collusion, 
both in Bertrand and Cournot, all points in the space are monopolized by one firm, the 
collusive profits must be the same in the two models (for a monopolist there is no 








C Π = Π . Consider a deviation by firm B.
20 When firm A sells 
A
C q  and 
firm  B  deviates  from  the  collusive  agreement,  firm  B  maximizes  ) , (
B A
C
B q q Π   with 
respect to 
B q , which yields the following deviation quantity schedule: 
 
4







In order to obtain a positive mark up when it serves a consumer located at  ] , 0 [ a x∈ , 




C , x ∀ ,  or 
t a b x x 1 2 * − − = ≥ , x ∀ .  Since  2 1 ≤ t   by  hypothesis  and  the  maximum  distance 
between firms is one, it follows that  0 *≤ x , which implies that the mark up of firm B is 
always positive. Therefore, the deviating firm sells a positive amount everywhere. The 
deviation profits of firm B are:  
 














D dx q x b t q p dx q x b t q q p )] ( ) , 0 ( [ )] ( ) , ( [
0  
48
) 3 3 3 ( 4 ) 4 3 ( 3 ) 2 1 ( 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 b t tb b tb a tb ta a t + − + − − + −
=                                        (16) 
 









B Π − Π Π − Π = δ . The sign  of the 
derivative  of  *
B δ   with  respect  to  a  and  b  is  difficult  to  be  derived  analytically. 
However, we undertake a series of computations for different values of  ] 2 1 , 0 ( ∈ t  and 
they  all  show  that  0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ a
B δ   and  0 * ≤ ∂ ∂ b
B δ .
21  This  confirms  that  the  results 
derived for the Bertrand game hold also with quantity setting firms. 
Consider now firm A. Firm A cannot profitably deviate through quantities, because it 
is already setting monopolistic quantities, but it can deviate refusing to give the fraction 
θ  of its collusive profits to firm B.  In this case, it obtains  G
A
D = Π  (note that the 
                                                 
20 We are implicitly assuming that deviation is not a priori unprofitable for firm B, that is, θ is assumed 
to be sufficiently low. 
21 The complete expressions of the derivatives are relegated in the appendix.    18 
deviation profits of firm A in Cournot coincide with the deviation profits in Bertrand, 
because firm A sets monopolistic quantities; this was not true for firm B). Therefore, the 




















δ *                                                                                         (17) 
 
Note  that  the  only  difference  with  respect  to  the  discount  factor  of  firm  A  in  the 
Bertrand  model,  *
A δ ,  regards  the  punishment  profits.  We  can  state  the  following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. The following inequalities hold:  0 * ≤ ∂ ∂ a
A δ  and  0 * ≥ ∂ ∂ b
A δ . 
 
Proof. Plugging (8) and (12) into (17) and then taking the derivative  of  *
A δ  with 
respect to a, we get: 
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Similarly, taking the derivative of  *
A δ  with respect to b, we get: 
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Proposition  5  shows  that  the  incentive  to  deviate  of  firm  A  in  the  Cournot  model 
depends on the location parameters in the same way as in the Bertrand model: higher a 
decreases the incentive to deviate, while higher b increases the incentive to deviate. In 
fact, when a increases, the competition between firms over the consumers located at 
] , 0 [ a x∈  during the punishment stage is fiercer, and the punishment profits of firm A 
are lower (punishment effect, see Section 4.1), and therefore the temptation to deviate of 
firm A decreases. At the opposite, when b increases, the punishment profits of firm A 
are higher, thus increasing the temptation to deviate of firm A. 
Also, note that  *
A δ  increases with θ , while  *
B δ  decreases with θ . Therefore, as in 
the Bertrand  framework, when the fraction of the collusive profits that goes to firm B is 
high, firm A has a greater incentive to deviate from the agreement than firm B, while the 






This paper considers a unidirectional Hotelling model, which differentiates from the 
standard  Hotelling  model  because  consumers  are  assumed  to  have  a  unidirectional 
purchasing ability, i.e. they can buy only from firms located at their right or only from 
firms located at their left. In the first part of the article we analyse the equilibrium which   19 
emerges in two different two stage games: in one game (Bertrand), we suppose that 
firms first choose location, and then set price schedules, where prices may be different 
across  locations;  in  the  other  game  (Cournot),  we  suppose  that  firms  first  choose 
location,  and  then  set  quantity  schedules,  where  quantities  may  be  different  across 
locations. We show that in both games, one firm locates at one endpoint of the market 
in  order  to  maximize  the  number  of  consumers  which  are  served  monopolistically. 
However, the equilibrium distance between the firms is quite different between the two 
models. In Bertrand, agglomeration never arises and the firm which is not located at the 
endpoint  locates  near  to  the  middle  of  the  segment.  Instead,  in  Cournot,  when 
transportation  costs  are  sufficiently  low,  agglomeration  arises:  when  there  is  no 
agglomeration, equilibrium distance between the firms is lower than in Bertrand. 
In the second part of the article, we study the impact of firms’ location on the ability 
of firms to preserve a joint profits maximizing collusive agreement (on prices or on 
quantities) from defection of one of the members of the cartel. In Bertrand, we obtain 
that when consumers can buy only from firms located on their right (left), the incentive 
to deviate of each firm decreases the more the firm is located to the right (left) and the 
more the rival is located to the left (right). In Cournot, numerical computations show 





In this appendix, we report the complete expression of  *
B δ  and the derivate of  *
B δ  
with respect to a and with respect to b. Plugging (9), (11) and (16) into  *
B δ , after 
simplifications, we get: 
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